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The European Union as a Model for Regional Integration: 
The Muslim World and Beyond
♣ 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The success of the European Union (EU) in reaching a relatively high level of integration 
among its constituent member states over a fifty-year period, has made it an attractive 
model for regional integration efforts elsewhere in the world. Being neither an 
international organisation nor a nation state in the traditional sense, the EU is sui generis 
in character. With its mode of decision-making (qualified majority voting), conflict 
resolution mechanism (role of the European Court of Justice), budgetary arrangements 
(revenue collection and distribution), and citizen involvement (direct elections to the 
European Parliament), the EU has features not found in international organisations. 
Whilst not being a state, the European Union takes on increasingly state-like functions 
through regulatory and governing mechanisms. It is not only an interesting experiment in 
trans-national democracy building, but also in actor building, both for domestic and 
external policy purposes. 
 
However, consideration of the EU as a model for other regional integration 
settings might be limited, given the unique circumstances in which it was established and 
promoted. Born out of conflict, the EU benefited from special circumstances in its 
development, e.g. the Cold War, the United States guarantee and nurturing role, and the 
industrialised nature of the European economies, which are not found elsewhere. It would 
therefore seem more appropriate to use the EU experience not as a model or blue print to 
judge the success or failure of other regional integration attempts, but rather as a 
yardstick for regional policy and institutional developments. The latter will be the focus 
for this paper.  
 
Another aspect that affects comparison with the EU, is the difficulty in identifying 
comparable regional integration units. The Muslim world is dispersed over wide parts of 
the globe, comprising different nations and circumstances such as Turkey’s affiliation 
with Europe, the link of Turk Republics in Central Asia with the Commonwealth of 
Independent States, the fundamentalist Shiite branch of Iran, the unstable conditions in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the guided forms of democracy in Indonesia and Malaysia. 
Given this dispersed geographic spread, an application can only be attempted with 
regions that are predominantly Muslim in composition. The Arab region (in a general 
sense) can be deemed such a region for comparison, and will be chosen for this purpose. 
But even here it is incorrect to assume that only the Arab region is predominantly Muslim 
in composition, as this attribute applies to the whole of the Middle East. Furthermore, it 
should be pointed out that the term “Arab” is used here in a loose sense and to denote 
primarily the group characteristics within a certain geographic region, rather than 
anthropological, cultural or sociological characteristics.  
                                                           
♣ I would like to acknowledge the assistance of Can Berk and Kamilah Khatib in the 
research of this paper.   2
 
Arab integration is usually described as a failure. In part this is due to an absence 
of democratic structures and the presence of Socialist Ba’th authoritarian regimes in some 
of the Arab countries and the existence of kingdoms, emirates or sultans that do not share 
their sovereignty with their public let alone with supranational institutions. There might 
be a question as to whether attempts by the US and its allies “to bring democracy” to Iraq 
will influence other authoritarian Arab countries to change their regimes peacefully. But 
even if such changes were to take place they might not necessarily translate into stronger 
levels of integration among the Arab states, as this might be resisted by both Israel and 
the USA, i.e., as perceiving the collective efforts of Arab countries as “too powerful in 
the region”. 
 
 Yet while such grandiose attempts as the United Arab Republic, the United Arab 
States and the Arab Union have failed, there have been several efforts, whether regional 
or sub-regional, which look promising. These include the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC), the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), the Arab Cooperation Council, and the United 
Arab Emirates. Moreover, there have also been joint attempts by Arab, at least by the 
large oil suppliers, to have a collective effect, or more precisely a crippling economic 
impact, on the countries of the EU. This was noticeable with regard to the formation of 
OPEC, in which Arab oil-producing countries played a significant role. But this might be 
seen more as a “co-ordination” rather than as an integration effort.  
 
 Why have the more grandiose Arab integration attempts not succeeded and the more 
modest efforts succeeded? What lessons can be drawn from European integration or 
in what way is EU integration instructive for policy and institutional developments in 
the Arab region?
1 In trying to find answers to these questions, an attempt will be 
made first to consider the concept of regionalism in the European and Arab setting. 
After this, the conditions deemed essential for the success of regional integration will 
be considered. 
 
Regionalism and Integration in the Arab and European Context 
Regionalism can be defined as a process that entails the creation of a new entity (a 
regional unit). It comprises a recognised framework of accommodation among member 
states on several issues like the exchange of goods, services, capital, or persons.
2 
 
  This concept is often analysed in terms of social, political, organisational and 
economic cohesiveness.
3 When applied to the Arab context, we will find that the Arab 
                                                           
 
1 Knud E. Jörgensen and Ben Rosamond, “Europe: Regional Laboratory for a Global Polity?” 
Paper presented at the 2001 Hong Kong Convention of International Studies, 26-28 July. “Globalisation 
and its Challenges in the 21
st Century”, CSGR working paper no.71/01 May 2001.  
 
2  Peter H. Smith, “Introduction. The Politics of Integration: Concepts and Themes” in The 
Challenge of integration: Europe and the Americas ed. P.H. Smith, (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1992).  
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countries witness cohesion in the aforementioned distinct categories, though in different 
degrees. The social dimension appears to be the strongest, with the majority of Arabs 
sharing such similar attributes as ethnicity, race, language, religion, culture, and the 
consciousness of a common history and heritage. 
 
  Arab regionalism, or Pan Arabism, has as its core concept the notion of 
awareness, identity, and consciousness.  These concepts link with social and cultural 
factors like the common language, religion and traditions. They also relate to common 
external perceptions involving either political threats (e.g. foreign colonialisation) or 
cultural challenges (like the influence of the western culture on Islam). In short, Arabs, 
regardless of the country of origin, share the perception of belonging to a particular 
community. Yet, it must be noted that substantial frictions prevail between Sunni and 
Shiite sects. 
  
Unlike Arabs, language, religion and culture are not common factors among the 
Europeans, where there are still substantial differences in identification, and feelings of 
‘us’ and ‘them’ across Europe.
4 It is however, remarkable that these differences have not 
prevented efforts to bind Europeans together, whereas, in spite of all the common 
features among the Arabs they have not established strong supra-national (or extra 
national regional) arrangements. Moreover, while Pan Arab ideology is characterised by 
harmony and brotherhood, it has not prevented conflicts among Arab states, such as the 
wars between Iraq and Iran, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, or the border dispute between 
Bahrain and Qatar. 
 
  In contrast, the EU can be seen as a security community as understood by Karl 
Deutsch, who refers to such an entity as where “a sense of community has been attained 
and where institutions and practices are strong enough and widespread enough to assure 
for a long time, dependable expectation of peaceful change among the population”.
5 
Since its inception, no hostile relations or conflicts have occurred among the member 
states of the EU, which reflects a degree of mutual respect and trust, along with the 
acceptance of shared interests and values among the member states.  
 
  Integration in the EU has taken place along several forms and dimensions. These 
have involved a high degree of political formations and institutionalism, both of which 
have resulted partly in a shift of power and authority from the national to the EU level, 
and partly in a pooling of sovereignty among the constituent member states. They have 
also contributed to a reasonably widespread sense of common identity and mutual 
obligations.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
3 Andrew Hurrell, “Explaining the resurgence of regionalism in world politics” Review of 
International Studies  21, no.4  (1995): 331-358.  
 
4 Neill Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union (London: Macmillan Press 
Ltd., 1999), 3. 
 
5 Karl W. Deutcsh, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation 
in the Light of Historical Experience (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1957).   4
  The depth of EU integration can be depicted by the existence of “common rules 
and standards to remove what might otherwise constitute non-tariff barriers to trade 
within a single market”.
6 The process of deepening integration has proven to have no 
definable limits.  The adoption of common policies in one area creates pressure for the 
adoption of common policies in other areas. This has not only led to the development of 
the Community rules and regulations, but also to the formation of Community law. The 
level of implementation and compliance by the member states and neighbouring 
countries could be moderately compared to the implementation of the Federal law in the 
southern United States half a century ago.
7 
  
  In contrast, Hoekman and Messerlin
8 see three substantial obstacles which Arab 
economic integration efforts confront. Firstly, “markets are generally small”. Secondly, 
“strong comparative advantages in certain products (natural resources) generate export 
concentration and require geographical diversification of exports beyond the region to 
reduce risk”. Thirdly, “major Arab countries do not appear to have strong incentives to 
take the lead in pursuit of merchandise trade-based economic integration, while smaller 
countries that do have the incentive do not have the influence to ensure implementation”.
9 
 
 Zarrouk
10 notes the beginning of a change with the implementation of the 1998 
Arab League Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA), which obliges signatories to 
gradually eliminate tariffs by 2006.  However, the GAFTA is a traditional agreement that 
is limited to merchandise trade. In contrast to the original EEC Treaty, the GAFTA does 
not imply the creation of a common market for services, investment and other factor 
flows. Nor does it involve the establishment of common institutions to address regulatory 
issues.  Therefore, as Hoekman and Messerlin argue, the Arab states, in order to deal with 
or overcome major political obstacles to integration, have to emulate the design of 
institutions that enabled European member states to succeed in this respect.
11 
  
Encouraging, though on a smaller scale, is that in 2003, GCC members not only 
eliminated tariffs on trade between member nations and established a common external 
tariffs, but they have also agreed to establish a broader economic union (including a 
single market and currency) by 2010.
12 In part due to the success in economic terms, 
                                                           
 
6 William Wallace, Regional Integration: the West European Experience (Washington D.C: The 
Brookings Institution, 1994), 6.  
 
7 Wallace, 6 
 
8 Bernard Hoekman and Patrick Messerlin, “Initial Conditions and Incentives for Arab Economic 
Integration: Can the European Community’s Success Be Emulated?” the World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 2921 (October 2002), 30. 
http://wdsbeta.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2002/11/22/000094946_02110
804064084/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf 
 
9 Bernard Hoekman and Patrick Messerlin, 30 
  
10 Jamel Zarrouk, ‘A Survey of Barriers to Trade and Investment in Arab Countries’, in B. 
Hoekman and P. Messerlin, Harnessing Trade for Development in the Middle East and North Africa 
(New York: Council for Foreign Relations), 2000. 
 
11 Bernard Hoekman and Patrick Messerlin, 1 
 
12 Encyclopedia Columbia University Press, 
http://www.answers.com/topic/cooperation-council-for-the-arab-states-of-the-gulf?hl=gcc#copyright   5
there have been interests for new members to join the CGC. For example, in 2005 Yemen 
was in negotiation for CGC membership.
13 The drawback with the CGC is that it 
involves a number of mostly small countries. For integration on a wider Arab perspective 
to succeed, Hoekman and Messerlin make a plausible case for a service-sector driven 
integration strategy. Given the importance of improving service sector performance in 
many Arab countries and the potential gains from regional co-operation in the regulatory 
domain, this may be a more effective route towards greater integration , not just 
regionally –where there is only limited potential and thus likely to be limited political 
support –but into the world economy generally. Thus the authors posit that: 
“The EC experience suggets a service-based integration strategy will be complex and 
should be carefully designed and sequenced. Intra-Arab co-operation in this area 
could start by focusing on addressing high logistics and trade-related transactioncosts 
(trade facilitation), establishing focal points and benchmarks for pro-competitive 
regulation of key ‘backbone’ service sectors such as transport, distribution and 
communication, and a concerted effort to remove entry barriers and government 
restricitions on competition more generally”.
14 
  
  Yet, even if such an approach were to be advanced, without complementary 
institutional ingredients, it would have difficulty sustaining itself. Judging from the EU 
experience what is of crucial importance is the introduction of a court that has ultimate 
interpretation, arbitration and sanction powers in cases of disputes among members. The 
European Court of Justice stands out as a monitoring and enforcement agency, which 
supervises the functioning of the national courts. There are many landmark cases of the 
European Court of Justice, like the ones establishing the primacy of Community law over 
national laws, or the introduction of the principle of “direct effect”, whereby EU 
legislation or Court judgements are directly applicable to national settings without having 
to be ratified either by national parliaments or courts. However, one of the most 
important judgements of the European Court of Justice relates to the Cassis de Dijon case 
of 1979. This was a turning point in the history of harmonisation because it gave the start 
to the application of the principle of mutual recognition, leaving behind the long and 
exhausting phase of detailed harmonisation. It enabled the realisation of the four 
freedoms: free internal movement of goods, services, capital and people. Importantly, 
though still contested (e.g., the so-called “service directive”), it includes the right of 
establishment. This has boosted EU efforts to establish a common market and to combine 
it with a common external commercial policy. The EU is thus unique in that it goes 
beyond intergovernmental co-operation. More generally, the European Court of Justice 
has ensured objective and consistent application and interpretation of EC law. 
 
  A further important institutional feature in the EU context has been the European 
Commission, combining both important administrative and executive features, and 
disposing over considerable financial resources. The European Commission has been a 
defender of the European integration process in times when member states have been less 
                                                           
 
13Wikipedia, the free Encyclopedia, in URL address: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gulf_Cooperation_Council  
 
14 Bernard Hoekman and Patrick Messerlin, 2.   6
than enthusiastic.
15 Finally, the directly elected European Parliament, particularly through 
the gaining of the assent procedure (in external treaties of the EU) and the co-decision 
procedure (in the framing of regulations and directives with member state governments) 
with regard to EU legislation in such vital areas as the internal market, has given the EU a 
mantle of democracy and a clout of legitimacy, and thus allowing a crucial link between 
elites and the public and between EU institutions and the citizens. It also lends credence 
to describing the EU as an embodiment of transnational democracy. 
 
As a unique phenomenon of international relations and regional integration, the 
EU has developed a distinct legal-institutional design. This model has been deliberately 
avoided by designers of regional orders in the Arab world (and elsewhere generally). 
  How far can the characteristics of a high degree of policy formation and 
institutionalisation, as prevail in the EU, be found in the Arab region as a whole and in 
the examples of Arab sub-regional integration? Let us look at the degree of policy 
formation in Arab integration first and then turn to the degree of institutionalisation and 
centralisation. 
Integration Efforts among Arab Countries 
 
When looking at Arab integration efforts one finds some similar institutional structures to 
those of the EU. But these do not carry the same jurisdiction as those of the EU. The 
Arab League has a summit of Heads of States, a Council of Ministers, a Standing 
Committee, and a Secretariat General; all reminiscent of the EU structure. Similarly, the 
Gulf Cooperation Council has a Supreme Council, a Ministerial Council, and a 
Secretariat General.  The Arab Maghreb Union consists of the Presidency Council, the 
Council of Prime Ministers, the Council of Foreign Ministers, the Specialised Ministerial 
Council, and several other councils.  
 
  However, all three lack central institutions capable of making decisions that are 
legally binding for its members. They are mere arenas for intergovernmental dialogues. 
There is no real resort to conflict resolution as is the case with the European Court of 
Justice. For example, the Gulf Cooperation Council has a commission for settlement, but 
it only has a consultative rather than a legally binding status. 
 
  Arab countries have launched many projects of joint action along economic and 
political lines. Examples of attempts to achieve economic integration include proposals 
for a customs union between Syria and Lebanon in 1947, and the agreement between 
Arab governments in 1997 to lift customs barriers and to reduce tariffs. There have also 
been attempts to set up an Arab free trade zone. However, so far only Egypt, Jordan, 
Morocco and Tunisia are bound bilaterally by accords setting up a free trade area.  
                                                           
 
15 Alan Winters, ‘What Can European Experience Teach Developing Countries About Integration?’ 
The World Economy 20, (1997): 889-912.   7
  With regard to the Gulf Cooperation Council, a turning point for financial policy 
harmonisation emerged in 1983 with the members’ approval of the Unified Economic 
Agreement. The agreement pledged the signatories to narrow the gaps among economic 
policies in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries with the ultimate goal to standardise 
them. It also addressed the practice of non-discrimination among Gulf Cooperation 
Council member-states in drawing up regulations governing the flow of labour and 
capital across their common borders, and the movement towards the standardisation of 
some laws, measures and procedures. 
 
  Standardised passports were provided around 1984 (three years after the 
establishment of the Council), and some laws have been amended to enable nationals of 
one state, equity investments in another country. In November of 1984 electric, water and 
telephone rates were standardised through the signing of an economic agreement among 
members.
16 Nevertheless, co-ordination of policies on other dimensions, apart from the 
economic ones, is still in the planning phase. 
 
  There have been some attempts that were mainly political in nature. However, 
most of them involved fusion and mergers, like the many proposals to create federations 
(between Iraq and Jordan in 1958, or between Egypt, Syria and Iraq in 1963 amongst 
others). But none of them endured for more than a short period of time. Defence has also 
been a driving power toward integration. The Arabs in fact tried to promote integration 
through the Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation of 1959, which was 
primarily a military defence pact. The results were similarly disappointing. 
 
  The most comprehensive attempt is represented in the League of Arab States, 
which was founded in 1945. It was meant to serve as a forum for political, defence, 
economic, financial, communication, cultural, social and health questions cooperation.
1718 
The Alexandria Protocol envisaged not only full unity, but also a common foreign policy 
for the signatory states.
19 Again, expectations have outstripped actual developments. 
 
  In short, institutions both in the Gulf Cooperation Council and in the Arab 
Maghreb Union, fall far behind being considered efficient institutions. Unlike the EU’s 
institutions, Arab institutions (as a whole and in the sub-groups) lack three main 
                                                           
 
16 Joan Haldane, “GCC: Moving Towards Unity” in the Washington Report on Middle East 
affairs, 1985,4 in URL address: http//:www.washington-report.org/backissues/020485/850204004.html. 
 
 
17 H.A.R Gibb, “Toward Arab Unity” Foreign Affairs, an American Quarterly Review 24, no.2 
(1945): 118-129. 
 
18 Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopaedia 2001, in URL address: 
http://encarta.msn.co.uk/find/Concise.asp?z=1pg=2&ti=761558355. 
 
19 J. Major, “The Search for an Arab Unity” International Affairs 34, no.4 (1963): 551-563.   8
characteristics: formal rules, informal constraints, and their effective enforcement.
20 This 
has implications for the spillover mechanism.  
 
  In the classical notion of neo-functionalists, integration in one sector would lead 
to a wider and deeper co-operation in the other correlated sectors, and it would involve an 
institution building process, followed by an upgrading of organisational form, leading 
subsequently to a shift of loyalties and expectations toward the new centre.
21 Although 
not in a strictly linear fashion, the European Union has largely followed the classical 
notion of spillover. In contrast, in the Arab context, we find only a sterile version of this 
concept. Sterile because agreements exist but they do not result in a widening of the issue 
areas or are not backed by essential/committed implementation.   
 
Conclusion 
An attempt was made in this paper to use the EU as a yardstick against which the strength 
of Arab regional integration can be measured. In the EU we find:  a wide variety of issues 
around which agreement and bargaining occur; a high degree of harmonisation, mutual 
recognition of policies, and institutionalisation; a degree of transfer of competencies to 
the Union; and a widespread feeling of a common identity and/or mutual obligations 
among the people of the Union. The same indicators are only weakly present in the Arab 
contexts. Closer integration is hampered by the absence of a well-embedded institutional 
fabric, political commitment among the governments or leaders, and a transnational 
business culture seeking the establishment of economies of scale. Arab integration 
therefore represents a form of integration that needs to develop more strongly along the 
above mentioned EU lines in order to reach a real integration potential. To promote such 
a development means dealing with prevailing geo-political circumstances and introducing 
domestic political reforms. The two are heavily interlinked. As noted by George T. 
Abed
22, partly because of the region’s geopolitical importance, external hegemonic 
influences prevail over weak state systems governed largely by authoritarian regimes.  
This, George T. Abed observes
23, is coupled with four other problems. Firstly, political 
fragmentation and recurring conflict have hampered the development of democratic 
institutions. Secondly, the demarcation lines between the public and the private sectors 
are often unclear, encouraging conflict of interest, rent seeking and widespread 
corruption. Thirdly, transparency in government is often poor and accountability rare. 
Fourthly, civil organisations, such as professional associations, free and independent 
media, and autonomous non-governmental entities, are weak and are often co-opted by 
                                                           
 
20 Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 1990), 9  
 
21 Ernest B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968). 
 
22 George T. Abed, “Unfulfilled Promise: Why the Middle East and North African region has 
lagged in growth and globalization” Finance and Development Quarterly Magazine of IMF 40, no.1 March 
2003 (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2003/03/abed.htm). 
 
23 Abed, 7-9   9
governments. As a consequence of these factors, citizen participation and private sector 
initiative have remained constrained.  
 
   It will be interesting to see to what extent Arab states can take up this challenge 
and overcome differences in the economic (rich and poor states), ideological (Sunnis 
versus Shiites or fundamentalist versus moderate forms of Islam) and political (over 
cooperation with western states, especially the United States) fields. Equally, it will be 
interesting to see to what extent the tendency for regional block formations, like NAFTA, 
Mercosur, APEC, and ASEAN, will stimulate further Arab regional integration. Yet the 
future development of Arab regional integration (whether on a general or sub-regional 
level) must also be seen in its relations with the Muslim world generally. Should the Arab 
regional integration efforts become stronger, and more like the integrative forms of the 
EU, a number of potential consequences or implications might also merit further 
attention. A more integrated Arab region might become more discriminatory in dealing 
with Muslim countries elsewhere in the world, in the way the EU is criticised as 
practising a “Fortress Europe” mentality. Such a scenario might therefore not be 
conducive towards greater cooperation among Muslim countries. Finally, also of interest 
for the future, will be whether the EU will promote greater Arab regional integration 
efforts, and how the EU will relate to these both economically and politically. 
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